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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to assess the status and prospects of the decarbonization of
maritime transport. Already more than two years have passed since the landmark decision of the
International Maritime Organization (IMO) in April 2018, which entailed ambitious targets to reduce
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from ships. The paper attempts to address the following three
questions: (a) where do we stand with respect to GHG emissions from ships, (b) how is the Initial IMO
Strategy progressing, and (c) what should be done to move ahead? To that effect, our methodology
includes commenting on some of the key issues addressed by the recently released 4th IMO GHG
study, assessing progress at the IMO since 2018, and finally identifying other issues that we consider
relevant and important as regards maritime GHG emissions, such as for instance the role of the
European Green Deal and how this may interact with the IMO process. Even though the approach
of the paper is to a significant extent qualitative, some key quantitative and modelling aspects are
considered as well. On the basis of our analysis, our main conjecture is that there is not yet light at
the end of the tunnel with respect to decarbonizing maritime transport.
Keywords: IMO; CO2 emissions; greenhouse gas emissions; decarbonization; maritime transport
1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to take stock of recent developments as regards the
decarbonization of maritime transport and assess prospects for the future. Already more
than two years have passed since April 2018, when the International Maritime Organization
(IMO)—the specialized agency of the United Nations (UN) regulating maritime transport—
reached a landmark agreement to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from ships,
so it seems pertinent to analyze where the maritime sector stands and where it is going as
regards that agreement.
The agreement in question came in the 72nd session of IMO’s Marine Environment
Protection Committee (MEPC 72) and is known as the Initial IMO Strategy [1]. It stipulates,
among other things, ambitious targets to reduce these emissions, and expresses a strong
political will to phase them out as soon as possible. The most ambitious of these targets
is to reduce GHG emissions by 2050 at least 50% vis-à-vis 2008 levels, and there is also an
intermediate target to reduce CO2 emissions per transport work by 2030 at least 40%, again vis-
à-vis 2008 levels. Some scientists and other stakeholders believe that the above targets are in
line with those set in the Paris Agreement on climate change (COP21), whereas others disagree,
believing that the targets are not ambitious enough or that they cannot be reached.
Being in line with the approach followed by the UNFCCC (the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change) since the Kyoto Protocol in 1992, the Paris Agreement
continued to exclude international shipping and aviation from its mandate. The rationale
is that these come under the jurisdictions of the IMO and ICAO (the International Civil
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Aviation Organization), respectively. Additionally, and according to Oberthür [2] another
reason is that no consensus could be reached on how to allocate emissions to countries;
many options were considered including no allocation at all, allocation to the country
where the fuel is sold, allocation to the country of the transporting company or the operator,
to the country of departure or destination, and possibly others.
It is also noted that, at least until the fall of 2020, the only mandatory regulatory
action limiting GHG emissions from ships has been the adoption of the so-called Energy
Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) by the IMO, which is an index that measures CO2 emissions
per tonne-mile. This was decided upon at MEPC 62 in July 2011 [3] after a vote in which a
number of developing countries raised strong objections to the agreement. MEPC 62 also
adopted the so-called Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP).
Some two and a half years after the adoption of the Initial IMO Strategy, and as this
paper was being finalized, a proposal on a possible short-term measure was approved by
MEPC 75 (November 2020), subject to a comprehensive assessment of its impact on states,
which would have to be conducted before MEPC 76, when the measure is expected to be
adopted (June 2021). The main aim of this measure is the satisfaction of the 2030 target.
The literature on ship emissions is immense, and it is not in the scope of this paper
to perform a comprehensive review of it. As early as 2000, the IMO published its first
study on GHG emissions from ships, which estimated that international shipping in
1996 contributed about 1.8 per cent of the world total anthropogenic CO2 emissions.
International marine emissions were estimated using a fuel-consumption methodology
and a statistical emission model. The first method was based on both actual and theoretical
emission factors combined with actual fuel consumption, i.e., based on international marine
bunker fuel sale figures. The second approach was a statistical emission model representing
the merchant world fleet. The first step was a breakdown of the world fleet according to
ship type, ship size, and engine type; a total of 43,325 vessels (excluding fishing vessels)
accounting for about 95% of the tonnage were analyzed. The main advantage of using a
dual approach is that one is able to provide estimate ranges of GHG emissions instead of a
single estimate.
Measuring maritime emissions is of paramount importance. However, very few
studies had actually tried to quantify emissions from ships before the IMO 2000 study.
Early works focused mainly on non-GHG gases, see for example Bremnes [4]. Corbett
and Fischbeck [5] presented a global emissions inventory of NOx and SOx emissions from
ships. Their model used data from marine exhaust emission tests reporting fuel-based
emission rates (i.e., used mainly to derive the emission factors), international marine-fuel
usage information, and the characteristics of the engines of commercial vessels.
After IMO [6] the number of studies estimating global carbon emissions significantly
grew. Detailed methodologies for constructing fuel-based inventories of world ship emis-
sions have been published by Corbett and Köhler [7], Endresen et al. [8,9], Eyring et al. [10],
Jalkanen et al. [11], Olmer et al. [12], and Johansson et al. [13], among others.
The interested readers are referred to Miola and Ciuffo [14] who present an excellent
meta-analysis of the studies published until around 2011 and to Nunes et al. [15] for a
review of 26 activity-based studies published since 2010 including details on parameters
used. Miola and Ciuffo [14] provide also a critical analysis of the emission modelling
approaches and data sources available (including AIS data), identifying their limitations
and constraints. There is also some good discussion on the various bottom-up and top-
down approaches. In addition, the third IMO GHG Study [16] presented an excellent
analysis of the data quality issues and the uncertainties related to both top-down and
bottom-up approaches.
The IMO has commissioned a total of four GHG studies, the first in 2000 [6], the second
in 2009 [17], the third in 2014 [16], and the fourth just recently in 2020 [18]. A paper of ours
on CO2 statistics for the world’s commercial fleet [19] was completed just before the second
IMO GHG study was released.
This paper attempts to answer the following questions:
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• Where do we stand with respect to maritime GHG emissions?
• How is the Initial IMO Strategy progressing?
• What should be done to move ahead?
As the rest of the paper will argue, there is cause for concern on the overall path to
stated targets. At the same time, some proposals are made to improve the situation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 addresses where we stand
as regards maritime GHG emissions and comments on the newly released fourth IMO
GHG study. Section 3 comments on the Initial IMO Strategy. Finally, concluding Section 4
formulates some thoughts on what may lie ahead.
2. Where Do We Stand as Regards Maritime GHG Emissions?
Perhaps the most definitive statement on where we stand on maritime GHG emissions
is contained in the fourth IMO GHG study [18], released in July 2020 and approved by
the IMO at MEPC 75 (November 2020). It is not in the scope of this paper to provide a
complete review of the study. This could be a major undertaking. However, we take this
opportunity to comment on some of what we consider key issues addressed by the study.
This is done in the sections that follow.
2.1. GHG Trends
The fourth IMO GHG study’s results are surely worthy of note. First of all, the study
found that total maritime GHG emissions, both international and domestic (of which more
in Section 2.2), including CO2, CH4, and N2O, and expressed in CO2 equivalent emissions
(CO2e), have increased from 977 million tonnes in 2012 to 1076 million tonnes in 2018
(a 9.6% increase). Roughly 98% of these are CO2 emissions.
According to the Initial IMO Strategy [1], GHG emissions by 2050 need to be at least
50% lower than what they were in 2008, which is considered as a base year. According to
the third IMO GHG study [16], in 2008, GHG emissions were 940 million tonnes, of which
921 million tonnes were attributed to CO2.
The fourth IMO GHG study presented the results of three different approaches:
bottom-up vessel based, bottom-up voyage based, and top down; see Figure 1. The bottom-
up voyage-based method defines international emissions as those that occurred on a
voyage between two ports in different countries (see also below), whereas the bottom-up
vessel-based method defines emissions according to ship types, as per the third IMO GHG
Study [16]. Both are calculated using an activity-based approach, according to which
fuel consumption is estimated for all ships in the world fleet (see also Section 2.5 below).
The top-down method calculates emissions based on fuel sales data. There is about a 10–
15% difference between bottom-up and top-down, which is narrower than the equivalent
gap in the third IMO GHG study, which was around 30–38%. This indicates a convergence
between bottom-up and top-down results.
In the third IMO GHG study, the method that was used for distinguishing between
international and domestic shipping was based on the ship type and size; for instance,
emissions from yachts, tugs, fishing vessels, and ferries less than 2000 GT fell into do-
mestic shipping [16]. This approach is referred to as the vessel-based (Option 1) method.
The new approach—referred to as voyage-based (Option 2)—uses AIS data to identify port
calls, which allows for a distinction between international and domestic trips, as further
explained in Section 2.2.
In terms of breakdown among ship types, Figure 2 is indicative, showing HFO-
equivalent fuel consumption for the major types of vessels in 2018. One can notice that
the class of dry bulk carriers is a very close second to containerships in terms of fuel con-
sumption. This can be explained perhaps by the observation that the dry bulk fleet is more
numerous than the containership fleet (11,268 ships vs. 5171 ships in 2018), which perhaps
neutralizes the fact that containership average speeds (and hence average per ship fuel
consumptions) are typically higher versus equivalent figures for bulk carriers.
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2.2. International vs. Domestic Shipping
The fourth edition of the GHG study use a novel method for the differentiation of
missio s betwee international and domestic shipping. The authors argue that this is
in better agreement with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climat Change (IPCC) Guide-
lines. This method was enabled by dvanc s in the use of AIS dat t identify port calls,
which allow allocation of discrete voyag s to be classified as e ther international or domes-
tic shipping. Th study found that every single vessel h s some portion of international
emissions. For major ship type dominant such s oil tankers, bulk carriers, and containers,
the study found that t e smallest size categor e have 20–40% f th ir emissions allo-
cated to int rnational shipping. For larger vessels, the allocation to international shipping
Sustainability 2021, 13, 237 5 of 16
varies depending on ship type, e.g., containers ~80%, oil tankers and bulk carriers ~90%,
and liquefied gas tankers ~100% (see also Figure 3).
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This new approach led to a significa t finding: In 2018, international shipping was
responsible for 755 million tonnes of CO2e emissions out of a total of 1076 million tonnes—
that is 70%. To put it in another way, 30% of total shipping emissions fell within domestic
emissions, that is, are now part of the national GHG inventories, roughly twice the magni-
tude estimated in previous studies. The reason for this change is solely due to the change
in the methodology to estimate international emissions. In fact, following the approach
used in the third IMO GHG study, international shipping GHG emissions were found to
represent 87% of total shipping emissions.
We note here that this might have serious political ramifications, as domestic emissions
fall within national responsibilities. The guidelines of the IPCC for the preparation of GHG
inventories and the reporting guidelines on annual inventories outline that emissions from
maritime transport should be calculated as part of the national inventories but should be
excluded from national totals and reported separately. Therefore, even though the details
of the new method are not yet absolutely clear, this allocation is indeed closer to the IPPC’s
definition of international emissions—that is, “emissions from journeys that depart in
ne country and arrive in a different country”. However, we n te that many times the
distinctio between dom stic and ternation voyages is not binary. A ship may at any
point in time carry a mix of domestic and international cargoes. In fact, most of the cargoes
on a ship that visits a sequence of several (say) Chinese ports before going to Europe may
be international. In that sense, one would need to be careful on whether to label all of that
ship’s emissions during the domestic leg of the ship’s trip as domestic. A better way might
be neither vessel-based nor voyage-based, but cargo-based, but this is probably the subject
of further research. For an excellent analysis of issues surrounding emissions allocation in
shipping, see Zhu [20].
In addition, one might argue that the correct approach is to estimate all the emissions
produced within the domestic boundaries of each country. There are actually several studies
that have assessed emissions within national or port boundaries; see Nunes et al. [15].
This is actually possible using AIS data, which inherently incl de both spatial and temporal
inf rmation. Therefore, it is theoretically feasible to estimate emissions within specific
geographic areas. In this way, even the “d mestic” part of international voyages could be
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estimated. The main difficulty is the extremely large volume of data required. As stated
in Yang et al. [21], if for a single vessel AIS data is transmitted every 10 s, then in a single
year, a total of over 3 million records could be generated. A rather small interval is actually
required in order to avoid misallocation of emissions. In any case, this is a huge task
and not compatible neither with the IPPC’s definition nor with the info gathered by the
current reporting schemes, for instance the IMO Data Collection System (DCS) and the EU
Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification (MRV) scheme.
As a result of the new method, international shipping GHG emissions (in CO2e) in
2008, according to the voyage-based allocation, were estimated at 794 million tonnes—
that is, 15% lower than the same estimate for 2008 in the third IMO GHG Study [16].
Both approaches used the same methodology, the difference being mainly in the way
they attributed voyages pertaining to international shipping. Given the importance of
the baseline year 2008 in the Initial IMO Strategy, a question is, would the IMO keep the
original estimate of the 2008 GHG emissions (as per the third IMO GHG study), or would
the new, lower estimate (as per the fourth IMO GHG study) be used?
In our opinion, the new method to delineate international from domestic maritime
GHG emissions runs the risk of creating confusion or loopholes regarding who is responsible
for what, as international GHG emissions come under the jurisdiction of the IMO, whereas
domestic emissions are the jurisdiction of member states (and, at a higher level, of the
UNFCCC). In reducing GHG emissions from ships, we believe that fragmentation and
overlaps of responsibilities should be avoided, and a uniform approach should be taken.
2.3. Speed over Ground vs. Speed through Water
AIS data obviously keep track of a ship’s speed over ground. This is not necessarily the
same as the ship’s speed through water, due to the possible presence of currents and tides.
However, in resistance and hence power and fuel consumption calculations, it is speed
through water that is the relevant variable. A ship going 15 knots over ground head-on
against a current of 3 knots consumes much more fuel and emits much more GHGs than
the same ship going 15 knots over ground with an astern current of 3 knots. In this case,
and assuming a cubic speed law, “much more” means more than a factor of 3 on a per day
basis and more than a factor of 2 on a per trip basis. This is the difference between going
18 knots vs. 12 knots through water with no current. Additionally, the average of the above
two fuel consumptions is not the fuel consumption at the average speed of 15 knots and no
current. Three-knot currents are not uncommon across the globe. This means that if speed
over ground is used instead of speed through water in these calculations (see also Section
2.5), fuel consumption may be misrepresented up or down, the magnitude of the error not
known. Yet, there is no correction in the various bottom-up models used in IMO GHG
studies to account for differences between these two speeds, speed over ground being the
one used because of AIS.
2.4. AIS data vs. Weather Information
Suppose a ship is observed sailing at an (over ground, AIS-reported) speed of 10 knots
in a particular situation. 10 knots is a low speed. The pertinent question is, are the 10 knots
due to a deliberate slowdown of the ship to that speed (slow steaming), or to the fact that
the ship cannot go faster as it tries to counter bad weather? The fuel consumptions in these
two cases are drastically different, the latter scenario likely involving significantly higher
fuel consumption and hence CO2 emissions. Yet, there is no distinction between these
two cases in an AIS-based model. There is a standard and uniform, independent of ship
and speed, in fact independent of actual weather conditions, “weather correction factor”
(or, sea margin) of 15% that is assumed in the fuel consumption calculation formula and is
used in all cases (see also Section 2.5). However, this factor is aggregate and used across
the board, and there is no attempt to link AIS information for a specific trip, which is very
detailed and ship/trip-specific, with corresponding information on the prevailing weather
conditions that pertain to that specific trip at the time the trip was taken. The lack of such
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a link may involve another approximation error, whose magnitude is again unknown.
In particular, if the ship slows down due to bad weather, the fuel consumption model (see
Section 2.5) underestimates fuel consumption.
2.5. Fuel Consumption Calculation
As in the third IMO GHG study [16], the model used in the fourth IMO GHG study [18]
(p. 78), in order to quantify a ship’s required propulsive power when it is navigating at a




















Wre f is the reference power as given in the fleet database, ti and vi are the
instantaneous drafts and speeds, respectively, as these are provided by AIS. The reference
draft (tref) and speed (vref) are also from the fleet database. The draft ratio exponent m is
assumed to be 0.66, while the speed ratio exponent n is assumed to be 3, being the same as
in the third IMO GHG Study [16]. In the denominator, ηw represents the weather modifier
to the ship’s propulsive efficiency (the value corresponding to a 15% sea margin is 0.867),
and ηf is the fouling modifier. A correction factor, δw, to
.
Wre f is applied to certain ship
types and sizes to adjust the speed–power relationship, as provided by the fleet database.
In addition to the approximations in formula (1) as per Section 2.3 (speed over ground)
and Section 2.4 (weather), an additional approximation involves the use of the ratio of
ship drafts (ti/tref) instead of the (more correct) ratio of ship displacements in the admiralty
formula [22]. This is tantamount to assuming that ship displacement is a linear function of
draft, which is surely an approximation. This approximation may be more reasonable if a
ship resembles a box and less reasonable for slender designs. The reason that drafts are
being used is that they are available in the AIS data, whereas displacement information is
not available.
The ship’s draft is actually an important parameter for an additional reason: In addi-
tion to Equation (1), it is used as a proxy to estimate the amount of cargo onboard the ship,
information required for calculations on EEOI (Energy Efficiency Operational Indicator).
Estimating cargo onboard the ship as a function of draft surely entails an additional ap-
proximation. Moreover, according to the study itself, there are two additional sources of
uncertainty: (a) there is no AIS-reported draft information in 2012–2016 for around 10%
of the vessels, and (b) some of the draft values are erroneous, the latter being related to
human error, also as draft measurements are entered manually on most vessels.
We also note that in order to calculate the cargo carried, the model needs to estimate
the lightweight of the ship (the works of Kristensen [23] and Lützen and Kristensen [24]
are used), and the amounts of ballast and fuel carried. These calculations entail additional
approximations.
Last but not least, and as argued in Psaraftis [25], the accuracy of information on vref
in fleet databases is often poor, with no independent verification of its accuracy. Moreover,
even the exponent n = 3 is not necessarily accurate (containerships being likely to have a
higher figure; see [26]), not to mention that additional approximations are introduced by
the hull fouling modifier, the actual values of which are not known but are assumed in the
study.
In short, we think that the approximations discussed in Section 2.3–Section 2.5, and the
associated errors thereof, can potentially be substantial.
2.6. Normal Cruising vs. Slow Transit Phases
Figure 4 from the study is also worthy of note. It presents the breakdown of GHG
emissions across different phases of operation for each ship type, as estimated using the
voyage-based allocation.
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Fig re 4. Proportion of international GHG emissions (in CO2e) by operational phase in 2018—Source: [18].
It can be seen that containerships, oil tankers, and cruise ships have the smallest
share of their emissions associated with the so-called “normal cruising” phase, due to
the dominance of time spent in the so-called “slow transit” phase. The latter is typically
defined when ship is at sea, but the main engine load is less than 65% of the maximum.
For containerships, it can be seen that in 2018, this phase accounted for as much as about
70% of a ship’s annual GHG emissions, whereas the cruising phase (defined as having
engine load 65% or higher) accounted for only about 25%. This result confirms downward
trends in ship speeds in various markets in recent years, which are due to factors such
as fleet overcapacity and low freight rates, even though the 4th IMO GHG study did not
attempt to investigate the reasons for such lower speeds. Independent of this, project
ShipClean (https://www.chalmers.se/en/projects/Pages/ShipCLEAN---Energy-efficient-
marine-transport-through_1.aspx) reported that significant slow steaming was observed
in transpacific container trades in 2018, with westbound speeds as low as 12.5 knots,
which correspond to main engine loads as low as 10% [27,28]. The same project also
documented significant speed directional imbalances in these trades, something that is also
prevalent elsewhere.
Be that as it may, the use of the term “slow transit” or “slow cruising” for a ship’s
operati al phase in the four IMO GHG study may be confu ing if misused for the phase of
slowing down w n a ship approaches a port, which is surely not what is meant. The same
is the case for the term “normal cruising”, which, a defined, has been the exception rather
than the rule in many cases. In many of the shipping markets today, slow s e ming is
normal practice.
2.7. On MACCs and Future GHG Em ssions Projections
Margi al Abatement Cost Curves (MACCs) are critical when i comes to assessing which
technologies are prone to lead to GHG emi sions reductions nd at what cost. The Marginal
Abat ment Cost (MAC) of a technology is efi t e marginal cost of implementing such
technology divided by the amount f CO2 it can avert. The new study spent considerable
time discussing the subject and updating the MACCs that were outlined in previous GHG
studies. To that effect, the study assessed the abatement potential and costs of 44 technologies
in four groups: energy-saving technologies, use of renewable energy, use of alternative fuels,
Sustainability 2021, 13, 237 9 of 16
and speed reduction. The study projected that in 2050, 64% of the total amount of CO2
reduction is expected to be ascribed to the use of alternative fuels.
A problem here is that there is significant lack of transparency on how these MACCs
have been constructed, in terms of costs and other data. Moreover, some measures that
were included in other studies, such as for instance the adoption of more slender hull
designs that would reduce ship resistance, or Just-In-Time port arrivals [29], were not
included in the MACCs of the fourth GHG study. Omission of some GHG reduction
alternatives would render projections of future GHGs inaccurate and GHG solutions sub-
optimal. In addition, MACCs are very much relevant whenever market-based measures
(MBMs) are contemplated, because a MAC of a specific technology can become negative
due to the use of an MBM, thus rendering that technology economically viable. However,
there is no mention of MBMs in the study. It is hard to imagine low or zero carbon fuels
being implemented without some sort of MBM that would incentivize their development,
and difficult to believe that the use of these fuels would just happen by itself.
Finally, as regards speed reduction that is one of the potential measures included in
the MACCs outlined in the four GHG study, it is clear that speed reduction can lead to
significant GHG emissions reductions. However, and as Psaraftis [28] points out, speed re-
duction can be the outcome of (a) a voluntary action (slow steaming) as a result of market
conditions, (b) a speed limit, and (c) a response to a bunker levy. Outcomes (a), (b), and (c)
are very different, at least in terms of cost and therefore MAC. It is not clear which of the
above options are examined in the fourth GHG study.
2.8. Methane and Black Carbon Emissions
An interesting result of the study has been the significant increase in CH4 emissions,
from 59,000 tonnes in 2012 to 148,000 tonnes in 2018 (vessel-based calculations). This is
a 174% increase, attributed mainly to a 30% increase in the use of LNG (liquefied natural
gas) as fuel and the ensuing methane slip during the period. It is however noteworthy
to mention that for 2012, the study estimates CH4 emissions to be 78% lower than those
estimated for the same year in the third IMO GHG Study. This is according to the authors
due to different modelling assumptions, i.e., the previous IMO study assumed that LNG
vessels were using an Otto cycle engine, which has a high CH4 emissions factor, whereas
the latest study sorts LNG-powered engines into four categories, the predominant engine
type being an LNG-diesel (dual fuel) engine with a low CH4 emissions factor [18] (p. 191).
However, methane slip in dual fuel engines is, according to industry circles, still an issue.
The study also reports on black carbon (BC) emissions—the first GHG study to do so.
BC, which is not a greenhouse gas, is a component of fine particulate matter and has a very
strong warming effect. It reports an increase in BC emissions of approximately 12% from
2012 to 2018—this is actually higher than the reported CO2 emissions increase. This is an
area that certainly deserves some further research; see also the submission by Finland and
Germany [30] that presents some analysis that indicates that new blends of low sulfur marine
fuel can contain a large percentage of aromatic compounds, which have a direct impact on
black carbon emissions. In any case, we feel that this study will provide some important
evidence in relation to the near-future IMO talks on BC regulations, which would include the
adoption of a ban of HFO in the Artic. Non-GHGs such as BC are of extreme importance,
as there might be other climate side-effects that have so far been largely ignored by the IMO;
see [31] for more on the integration of climate change and air pollution regulations.
2.9. Summary
As expected, the fourth IMO GHG study was approved in IMO’s MEPC 75 (November
2020), and, in that sense, it can be considered as “the Bible” of knowledge on maritime
GHG emissions, at least for the foreseeable future. Surely such knowledge is a necessary
prerequisite for any attempt to reduce these emissions. If we do not know where we stand,
it will be impossible to choose the path that would reach whatever target is set.
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An observation is that complexity and sophistication seem to be rising as we move
from earlier editions to most recent editions of IMO GHG studies. The first IMO GHG
study in 2000 was 169 pages. The second one in 2009 was 280 pages. The third one in
2014 was 327 pages. The fourth one in 2020 was 578 pages, and it would be even longer
if many of the figures were kept at normal size. Interesting and worthy of note as the
fourth GHG study’s results might be, and even though the authors of this study should
be commended for their efforts, it has become practically impossible to validate the ever-
increasing number of assumptions that ever more complex analyses make in order to arrive
at these results, or understand exactly how the increasingly complex models used in this
study operate. To much of the scientific community, most of these models are “black boxes”,
meaning that many of the algorithms and the data they use are not readily available for
scrutiny and are full of assumptions on critical parameters, many of them not explicitly
stated. Full transparency is an essential element of any scientific endeavor, and lack of full
transparency undermines the credibility of any scientific result. Moreover, those of the few
mathematical relations that are available for scrutiny, for instance formula (1) in Section 2.5,
are seen to involve many approximations and assumptions and thus many possible errors.
The combination of lack of modelling transparency and the potential errors as identi-
fied in previous sections can lead to this implication: for all the elaborate effort that went
into the fourth GHG study, and for all the very useful information and other data this study
has compiled, we do express some honest reservations on the methodology of this study as
a basis to estimate maritime GHG emissions. This is true as regards estimates of past GHG
emissions, and is even more true regarding projections of future GHG emissions.
Is there an alternative, at least to keep track of current GHG emissions? We think
there is, and it is a “Columbus egg” solution. Mandate a device inside the stack of all ships
(maybe above a certain size) that can directly measure GHG emissions, and have that device
send its measurements directly to the IMO. Direct emissions monitoring provides robust
and transparent data for the operators, and for automatic reporting to the regulator (the
IMO) and the enforcement authorities. According to Devanney [32], “CO2 stack emissions
can be monitored to an accuracy of better than +/−2% in a reliable, tamper-proof, difficult
to spoof manner for about $60,000 per ship. And as a bonus, we can throw in a direct,
encrypted transfer of the data via satellite to a central processing entity.” Note that this was
in a 2011 paper, and there has been much progress since.
Such devices could be certified by the IMO or by other regulatory bodies such as the
USA’s EPA, Germany’s TÜV, and the British MCERTS. Similar devices (which however do
not measure flow volume) are compulsory on ships equipped with scrubbers to measure
sulfur emissions as part of the onboard procedures for demonstrating compliance with
the “2015 Guidelines for Exhaust Gas Cleaning Systems”; see [33]. These devices could
directly transmit GHG statistics to the IMO. Installing such devices would obviate the need
for future GHG studies and could provide instant information to the IMO on where we
stand as regards GHG emissions. These devices can also verify compliance with the sulfur
regulations—no need for onboard inspections to be carried out by the Port State Control or
drones to sniff emissions.
As for any simple solution, there will be objections to it. One objection may be from
ship owners, who may be afraid (and maybe for a good reason) that this may eventually
be used to directly tax GHG emissions [32]. Another objection may come from those
who undertake studies that estimate GHG emissions, or from certified verifiers of GHG
emissions. These objectors may, for different reasons, find all kinds of defects in the direct
measurement idea, for instance that such devices do not exist, they are unreliable, can be
tampered with, are expensive, etc. There are many interests at the IMO, and the fate of
any solution depends, to a significant extent, on the degree of support that the solution
may find, or not find, among IMO stakeholders (for a recent analysis of influence as well as
transparency at the IMO see [34]).
We think that some courage would be necessary to proceed to such a direct measure-
ment solution. At the moment, it is not even on the table at the IMO, even though the EU
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MRV scheme includes this solution in its roster of solutions to report fuel consumption,
among several others. A move in the right direction is the implementation of IMO’s DCS
on fuel consumption for all ships of 5000 GRT and above from 2019 on; however, additional
steps need to be taken if one is to make direct measurement of emissions a mandated
measure.
But even assuming that this issue is resolved and GHG emissions can be estimated in
a more reliable way, the very pressing question is how to reduce them. The next section
attempts to address this question.
3. Assessing Progress on the Initial IMO Strategy
As stated earlier, in 2018, the IMO adopted the so-called Initial IMO Strategy [1],
which set out a vision to drastically reduce GHG emissions from international shipping.
Ambitious targets were set (a)“to reduce CO2 emissions per tonne-mile as an average
across international shipping by at least 40% by 2030, pursuing efforts towards 70% by
2050, compared with 2008”; and (b) “to reduce the total annual GHG emissions by at
least 50% by 2050, whilst pursuing efforts towards totally phasing them out”. The Initial
IMO Strategy also calls “to peak GHG emissions from international shipping as soon as
possible and to reduce the total annual GHG emissions by at least 50% by 2050 compared
to 2008” [1].
More than two years after the Initial IMO Strategy was adopted, the question is,
where do we stand as regards progress on realizing the above targets? To attempt to answer
this question, the following can be said:
The Initial IMO Strategy did not initially prioritize among the wide array of candidate
measures, except it was decided to focus on short-term measures, that is, measures to be
agreed upon and implemented by 2023. A detailed schedule of action to 2023 was drafted;
however, difficulties of negotiating a consensus on this plan across stakeholders were
apparent, as most notably attested by the substitution of the word “prioritization” (of the
candidate measures) by the word “consideration”, which surely projects a much weaker
political will.
Related difficulties of political nature are not uncommon at the IMO. In fact, two stated
principles that were centrally included in the Initial IMO Strategy are (a) non-discrimination/
no more favorable treatment and (b) common but differentiated responsibilities and respec-
tive capabilities (CBDR-RC). These seem to be in direct conflict with one another. CBDR-RC
has been the main political argument of a group of developing countries to resist GHG
emissions reduction, not just for shipping but across the board, on the grounds that this
would impede their economic development. In that sense, the stance of these countries
is that their obligation to reduce GHGs should be less stringent than that of developed
countries. Even though CBDR-RC has not been explicitly invoked very frequently after
the adoption of the Initial IMO strategy, no way to circumvent CBDR-RC has been found.
As Psaraftis and Kontovas [34] pointed out, it is conceivable that shipping companies or
other industrial interests in these countries may be responsible for these countries’ stance
on CBDR-RC and hence GHGs. In that sense, CBDR-RC, even though it invokes a societal
cause enshrined in the Kyoto protocol, may be used as an argument to “camouflage”
whatever other real reasons might exist for those countries’ stance on GHGs.
Then there was an inordinate, at least in our opinion, amount of discussion on the
imposition of mandatory speed limits as a short-term tool to reduce GHG emissions,
apparently as a bridge until longer-term measures could be adopted. The standard bearers
for such a proposal were non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the clean
shipping coalition (CSC). These NGOs had originally proposed speed limits as far back as
2010; however, their proposals were rejected by the IMO. However, after MEPC 72 (April
2018), these proposals resurfaced, and in addition to CSC, more players joined the speed
limit bandwagon. France submitted a document to the IMO supporting the idea. Greece
submitted another document advocating mandatory speed adjustments or maximum
allowed main engine fuel consumptions. At both MEPC 74 (May 2019) and the sixth
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intersessional meeting that preceded it, environmental groups protested in front of the IMO
headquarters, asking for ships to slow down to save the planet. MEPC 74 did not endorse
the measure and the speed limit lobby further lost steam at the seventh intersessional
meeting after MEPC 74 (November 2019), as the short-term roster of measures that were
recommended then did not favor speed limits as an option. For a comparison between
speed limits and a bunker levy, see [28]. In that reference, it is argued that speed limits can
hardly incentivize an improvement in ship energy efficiency, are likely to cause considerable
distortions, and would be difficult to enforce.
In a parallel development, and in the context of the European Green Deal [35], the Pres-
ident of the European Commission indicated in December of 2019 that shipping would be
included in the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), and the European Parliament voted
in September of 2020 to include shipping into the EU ETS. This was a major development,
and one that appears to meet with the strong opposition of major shipping associations.
The European Commission is working on an impact assessment study to ascertain exactly
how such a scheme will be implemented, with results expected in the summer of 2021.
An ETS definitely belongs to the category of MBMs, which as mentioned above IMO lists
as potential medium-term measures.
At this point in time, the two processes, IMO and EU, appear to be completely
disconnected. There is no substantial mention of EU ETS in any of the current items on
the IMO GHG agenda. However, the inclusion of shipping into the EU ETS may render
measures or any other measure not fully relevant if implemented in parallel with the
EU ETS. In contrast to the IMO process, which has been delayed due to the COVID-19
outbreak in the spring of 2020, the EU process is very much up and running, with a flurry
of legislative activities in the European Parliament, which seems eager to push the EU ETS
agenda. The pertinent question is, assuming that the plans to include shipping into the EU
ETS go ahead, as it looks likely, how would these plans intersect with the implementation
of any short-term measure that would be adopted at the IMO?
The answer to this question is not clear yet. An inclusion of shipping into the EU ETS
could also potentially undermine IMO’s agenda on MBMs, as the difficulties of combining
a global IMO MBM with a regional EU ETS could be substantial.
An interesting development that could boost R&D for energy saving technologies and
alternative fuels is the proposal that several major shipping associations to the IMO (ICS,
BIMCO, WSC, Intertanko, Intercargo, Interferry, CLIA, and IPTA) submitted to IMO/MEPC
75. They proposed a 2 USD/tonne mandatory surcharge on bunker fuel, which could
generate about 5 billion USD over a 10-year period, to fund a non-governmental R&D
organization in order to accelerate efforts toward decarbonization [36]. This proposal is not
considered as an MBM; however, its proposers stated that its architecture could be used
in case the IMO wants to proceed with a levy, implying that this is their preferred MBM.
However, the response to this proposal by IMO member states at MEPC 75 (November
2020) was lukewarm at best, with some member states even suggesting that this proposal
would introduce MBMs to the IMO via the back door. Thus, no decision on the matter was
made at MEPC 75. As this paper was being finalized, the fate of this proposal remained
unclear.
At the same time, and after a discussion that lasted some 2.5 years, MEPC 75 decided
on a short-term measure. This measure is more focused towards meeting the 2030 carbon
intensity target than the 2050 target.
More specifically, MEPC 75 approved a combined short-term mandatory measure that
was agreed during the seventh intersessional meeting (October 2020). This would require
ships of 5000 GRT and above to combine two measures to reduce their carbon intensity
and achieve the IMO’s 2030 goals. These would add further to the existing requirements
that are described above. Currently, per the EEDI regulation, ships built after 2012 are
required to be designed and built more efficiently than the baseline. A similar approach
is to be used for existing vessels based on a new indicator, the Energy Efficiency Existing
Ship Index (EEXI), applicable after 2022. The attained EEXI should be calculated and
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verified for each existing ship, and this would indicate the “estimated performance of the
ship in terms of energy efficiency”. Ships will be required to meet a required EEXI—that
is a percentage of the EEDI baseline value—depending on the ship type and category.
For example, the reduction factor (in percentage) for the EEXI relative to the EEDI baseline
for a very large containership (above 200,000 DWT) is set to be at 50%, whereas for a tanker
or bulk carrier of similar size it is only 15%. This annual ship-category and type specific,
reduction factor is to be increased progressively to meet the objectives of the Initial IMO
Strategy. Note that, unlike a true operational efficiency standard, the EEXI would limit the
amount of CO2 emitted per unit of transport supply rather than per unit of actual transport
work, that is, does not take into account the cargo transported. It is expected that these
limits will not be difficult to achieve, even for older vessels using Engine Power Limitation
(EPL), which is one of the main ways to achieve the desired EEXI. Given the widespread
use of slow-steaming in recent years, it is unclear what the effect of this measure would be
in reducing GHG emissions.
The second component of the measure is related to operational carbon intensity reduc-
tion requirements, based on a new operational carbon intensity indicator (CII), and is to be
applied after 2025. After the end of each calendar year, the annual operational CII will be
calculated using data collected as part of the IMO DCS. This annual index (attained CII) will
then be verified against the required annual operational CII to determine the operational
rating (given on a five-point scale from “A” to “E”). Vessels that are underperforming (rated
E or rated D for three consecutive years) will have to develop a plan of corrective actions;
however, there is no serious enforcement mechanism, and such ships would continue to
sail. At the same time, the MARPOL revisions encourage administrations, port authorities,
and other stakeholder to provide incentives for high performing vessels (those rated as A
or B), although it is not clear what these incentives would be. The operational indicators are
yet to be agreed, but they can be based either on transport work using the energy efficiency
operational indicator (EEOI) or the annual efficiency ratio (AER).
Per IMO rules, the decision of MEPC 75 on the short-term measure would be followed
by its eventual adoption at MEPC 76 (June 2021). Further, MEPC 75 decided that a com-
prehensive impact assessment of the measure would have to be conducted and submitted
before MEPC 76 (June 2021) and is to be considered as an integral part of the package.
This assessment would investigate the potential impacts of the measure on states, including
disproportionately negative impacts. Some IMO member states, including developing
economies, small island developing states (SIDS) and least developed states (LDCs) are
concerned that measures to curb GHG emissions that lead to speed reduction or lead to
increased transport costs or generally to negative or disproportionately negative impacts
on the respective economies. A number of impact assessment studies have been conducted
for the variety of short-term measures proposed to the IMO, but none has been conducted
for the combined measure.
4. Conclusions
On the basis of the above, what can we say as regards the prospects of shipping
decarbonization?
First of all, it is too early to assess and comment on the combined short-term measure,
and its comprehensive impact assessment is pending. Environmental groups and some
countries in Europe and the Pacific have expressed dissatisfaction as regards the measure’s
level of ambition; however, it is not clear if something better can find consensus at the
IMO. In addition, if negative or disproportionately negative impacts are found, these might
slow down the speed of implementation of the measure, or even derail it completely.
This remains to be seen.
As regards meeting the 2030 target, a number of carbon intensity metrics including
EEOI (g CO2/t/nm) and AER (g CO2/dwt/nm) were reported in the fourth IMO GHG
study. EEOI takes into account the actual cargo transported, and it is probably a better re-
flection of the true carbon intensity, provided of course that cargo onboard can be accurately
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estimated. Although the calculation of the EEOI is considered as the primary monitoring
tool—as per the 2016 Guidelines for the development of a Ship Energy Efficiency Man-
agement Plant (SEEMP)—EEOI-related data are not reported to the IMO and could be
difficult to verify. Various other reservations are also reported on the reliability of EEOI as
an operational index (see [25,37,38] among others). By contrast, the deadweight of a vessel
is known and is reported along with the data collected as per IMO’s DCS. The calculation
of the AER for a vessel is therefore very straightforward.
According to the fourth IMO GHG study, the industry has already achieved a 29%
reduction (from 15.16 g CO2/t/nm in 2008 to 10.7 g CO2/t/nm in 2018). A further analysis
of the voyage-based EEOI reveals that containerships and bulk carriers have already
achieved a reduction of around 35%, and bulk carriers a remarkable reduction of 60%.
On the other hand, LNG tankers show an increase of 7%. If AER is used as a proxy for
carbon intensity, international shipping has achieved already a 21% reduction, versus the
40% reduction target of 2030. Note that these carbon intensity metrics make more sense
if viewed at a global (or even sectoral) fleet level rather than at an individual ship level,
due to the number of uncertain factors that may impact the environmental performance of
any individual ship.
However, even if one assumes that meeting the 2030 target may look within reach,
meeting the 2050 target is a very different story. It is clear that for this to happen, one would
need a quantum leap in energy saving technologies and alternative fuels. In spite of continuing
progress, our opinion is that such a quantum leap will not happen by itself. One would need
to provide the proper incentives to do so. The pertinent question is, what should such an
incentive be. We believe that an answer (and perhaps the only answer) is MBMs. These could
incentivize the development of alternative fuels and other energy saving technologies that are
currently non-viable, plus they could produce short-term benefits as well, by inducing slower
speeds and thus reduced emissions. Putting it more simply, so long as fossil fuels are cheap,
people will use them, and MBMs would be a mechanism to internalize the external costs of
GHG emissions and apply the polluter pays principle.
However, MBMs are currently almost invisible on the IMO agenda. Some Pacific SIDS
have asked MEPC 75 to reopen the MBM discussion as soon as possible; however, there was
no consensus for this proposal, and it is still unclear how and when this discussion will
continue at the IMO. Surely MBMs are very visible on the EU agenda; however, it is not yet
clear what the inclusion of shipping into the EU ETS would entail. More on MBMs can be
found in [39,40].
In our opinion, the pace of implementing the Initial IMO Strategy has been, at least
thus far, rather slow. At the time of writing of this paper, the most significant development
after April 2018 has been the decision of MEPC 75 to proceed with a combined short-
term measure. This measure seems to be primarily tailored to satisfy the 2030 40% target.
However, how far the measure might take us along that path is not yet clear. A fortiori,
how far this measure will succeed in terms of meeting the 2050 50% target is, at this point
in time, completely unknown. No other medium-term or long-term measure is yet on the
table at the IMO.
In conclusion, and as the subtitle of the paper has posed the question if in the quest
to decarbonize shipping there is light at the end of the tunnel, our very honest position,
and based on all we know at this point in time is, “not yet”.
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